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1. Introduction 
In 2014 violent conflict erupted in eastern Ukraine, and, despite several international cease fire 
agreements signed by all parties involved, not a single day goes by without a violation (Status Report 
as of 14 June 2017 OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, 2017). In a discussion on the 
development and future of the conflict, a Ukrainian citizen argued that ‘it is because of the language 
that Russians are not able to beat Ukraine: as Ukrainians speak both the Russian and the Ukrainian 
language, they can withstand the more experienced Russian army: knowing the language of their 
enemy gives them a huge advantage. Russia, on the other hand, has a hard time beating Ukraine 
because they do not know the Ukrainian language, and thus they cannot fully understand their enemy.’ 
(PS). Many readers who are unfamiliar with the language situation in Ukraine might deduce from this 
statement that within Ukraine most people speak Ukrainian and know Russian as a second language, 
while in Russia most people speak and know only Russian. Those readers, like most first-time visitors 
to Ukraine, would be surprised to hear that the majority of the inhabitants of Kyiv, the capital of 
Ukraine, actually speak Russian (Pavlenko, 2010, p. 148). Even within the Ukrainian army and in this 
very conflict, half of the Ukrainian soldiers are Russian speakers according to estimates by journalists 
(Rudoms'kyj, 2016). Russian is the native language and most used language of many Ukrainians, but 
at the same time it is considered to be the language of their enemy. These characteristics seem 
contradictory, yet both of them exist alongside each other. This appears to be problematic, and 
therefore it seems possible that the contradictory characteristics could cause changes in language 
attitudes and/or language use. These observations form the main motivation for choosing the language 
situation in Ukraine, and more specifically the possible developments in language use and language 
attitudes, as the topic of this thesis.  
Language and conflict 
Whenever there is contact between two (or more) linguistic groups, there are bound to be tensions; and 
these tensions are likely to result in language conflict. A language conflict is usually defined as a 
situation of asymmetrical multilingualism, i.e. a situation in which there are differences between the 
social status, economic wellbeing, and political and religious values of speakers of different language 
varieties, and these social differences become connected with the linguistic differences (Darquennes, 
2015, p. 13). Contrary to what the term ‘conflict’ might suggest, language conflict generally does not 
include violent actions like riots or all-out war but is limited to ‘fighting’ on a discursive level: 
opposing opinions on the use and institutionalization of different language varieties are discussed and 
debated in politics and in the media (Darquennes, 2015, pp. 13-14). In Ukraine, a non-violent language 
conflict was already present before 2014, but it is expected that the outbreak of the violent conflict will 
affect the language conflict that already existed. The pre-existing language conflict, i.e. the 
competition between the official status and institutionalization of the Ukrainian and Russian languages 
in Ukraine, has become part of the violent conflict as one of the languages is now marked as the 
language of the ‘enemy of Ukraine’ in that violent conflict. Furthermore, the status and use of the 
Russian language are an important factor within the conflict (cf. Ghosh (2014) and the Minsk 
Agreements); some politicians and scholars even argue that it is primarily an ethnolinguistic conflict 
(cf. Wade (2015)). If language was indeed one of the main causes of the violence, it would mean that 
the pre-existing language conflict had turned violent, but a careful analysis of censusdata and other 
factors that can cause violence indicates that the conflict is not along ethnic or linguistic lines (e.g. 
according to the latest Census ethnic Ukrainians formed an absolute majority in both Donec’k and 
Luhans’k regions (All-Ukrainian Census 2001: national and linguistic affiliations, 2001); Mylovanov 
(2016) shows that economic characteristics of a region are stronger and more robust predictors to rebel 
activities than the spread of the Russian language; and Wilson (2016) argues that the war is also due to 
Russian sponsorship and the actions of the local elite). These studies provide substantial evidence that 
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the violence is not caused by the language conflict, yet the framing of the conflict as ethnic means that 
the language issue is playing a significant role in the peace negotiations and the discourse about the 
conflict.  
Theoretical framework 
Taking a military conflict as the starting point to analyze a language conflict is an angle within conflict 
linguistics that, as far as I know, has not been used in previous studies. In order to provide a clear and 
complete theoretical background for this new angle of research, a general overview of the main issues 
and ideas from the research fields that are most relevant for this topic will be given in the next chapter. 
These fields are contact linguistics and conflict linguistics (e.g. Darquennes (2015) and Vetter (2015)); 
conflict studies (e.g. Footitt and Kelly (2012)); translation studies (e.g. Rafael (2010) and Baker 
(2010)); and language and identity studies (e.g. Edwards (2009)).  
From these fields, three important concepts have been selected that are central to the analysis of the 
data and form the basis for the development of a framework of how a conflict affects language use and 
language attitudes. These concepts are ‘divergence’, a strategy used to dissociate oneself from an 
interlocutor by increasing the linguistic distance (Giles (1973)); ‘intentional language change’, i.e. the 
idea that people can consciously change their language (Thomason, 2006); and ‘indexicality’, the 
notion that the use of a certain language variety indexes many social meanings (Johnstone, Andrus, & 
Danielson, 2006); see for a more detailed description section 2.5. 
Research questions 
On the basis of the theoretical concepts described above it is expected that Ukrainians might change 
their language use in order to create more linguistic distance between the groups fighting on opposite 
sides of the military conflict. This thesis will therefore focus on whether the current military conflict in 
Ukraine affects the language use and attitudes of Ukrainians, and, if it does, which changes can be 
observed. This topic has been split into the following three subquestions: 
I. Are Ukrainians changing their language use since violent conflict erupted in 2014? 
II. Are Ukrainians changing their language attitudes since violent conflict erupted in 2014? 
III. Can the conflict be seen as causing these changes or are they due to other factors? 
To find an answer to these research questions, the developments in the language use and attitudes were 
analyzed based on relevant scholarly literature on the topic and an empirical study of the results of 
language monitoring, surveys, and other relevant data on social media which will be discussed in 
chapter 4. This study was complemented by an online survey, which was developed as part of this 
thesis and included questions on language use, language attitudes, and possible changes since 2014. 
Furthermore, qualitative data were gathered during a field trip to Ukraine in the spring of 2017; the 
methodology and results of the survey and the fieldwork will be discussed in chapter 5. These chapters 
are preceded by an overview of the language situation in Ukraine before 2014 in chapter 3, which will 
provide a solid background for the understanding of the recent developments. In chapter 6 the results 
of the empirical study, survey, and fieldwork are discussed, and on the basis of the results a framework 
of how a military conflict can affect language use and language attitudes is developed. This chapter is 
followed by the conclusion, the bibliography, and the appendices. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
To the best of my knowledge there is not (yet) an encompassing theory on the effects of a (military) 
conflict on language use and language attitudes (neither in a bilingual nor in a monolingual setting). 
Therefore, several linguistic theories that relate to (a part of) this topic or explore it from a different 
angle will be discussed in this chapter in order to create a clear and complete theoretical framework for 
the research presented in this thesis. These theories will be followed by a more detailed description of 
the three main theoretical concepts of this thesis, i.e. divergence, intentional language change, and 
indexicality. 
2.1 Conflict and language 
Conflict, like most human phenomena, cannot happen without language. Even though we all 
intuitively know this, it is hard to determine what ‘language’ contributes to conflict specifically. As 
Chilton  points out, language is part of most human social behaviors, and therefore it is impossible to 
isolate ‘language’ as a specific factor (Chilton, 1998, p. 2). He further argues that language cannot be 
seen as the cause of violent conflict despite the close links and definite contributions to it. One of the 
ways in which language contributes to conflict is through discourse: it is within a discourse that our 
concepts of ‘war’ and ‘violent conflict’ are conceptualized, and it is also through discourse that a 
rivalry or enmity between two or more groups is promoted (ibid. (pp. 6-10)). Secondly, language plays 
a fundamental role in communication. In a conflict situation this refers to both the communication 
between the different agents on one side of the conflict, i.e. the commander and soldiers, and the 
communication between the parties on opposite sides when declaring war and in peace negotiations 
(ibid. (pp. 11-14)). The final link between conflict and language is found in the idea of linguistic 
homogenization: the conviction that one nation should speak only one language. This idea causes 
tensions and can lead to violent conflict when nations want to conquer areas where the same language 
is spoken or groups that speak a different language variety want to form an independent nation (ibid. 
(pp. 4-5)). Chilton argues that in such instances ‘linguistic difference [is] being selected and given 
political significance specifically to create identity through difference. To this extent the activity of 
codifying what may be naturally occurring differences contributes to cultural structures maintaining 
structures of hostility, violence, and warfare.’(ibid. (p. 5)).This is not only the case in wars: in her 
newest book, Piller shows extensively how many forms of social injustice and discrimination are 
anchored in linguistic differences (Piller, 2016). This thesis will build on the idea that linguistic 
differences are used and manipulated for political purposes in times of conflict: it is expected that the 
language use and language attitudes in Ukraine are changing as a result of the ongoing war. 
2.2 Contact linguistics and conflict linguistics 
Besides Chilton’s article on the relation between conflict and language, there is actually a whole field 
of study devoted to language conflict: conflict linguistics (which was already mentioned in the 
introduction). The field of conflict linguistics is furthermore closely related to contact linguistics, both 
in methodology and the topics of research. ‘Nelde’s law’ even states that there cannot be language 
contact without language conflict: even in situations where people might not be aware of a conflict, 
there is still latent tension between speakers of different languages (Nelde, 1995; Vetter, 2015, p. 107). 
The most important argument in favor of this law is the fact that there are no communities (known to 
us) that exhibit real and long-term symmetrical bilingualism; and, as was said before, whenever there 
is asymmetrical bilingualism, there will inevitably be (latent) tensions between speakers of the 
different languages or language varieties. This is also reflected in the idea that in every multilingual 
community there is a dominant and a dominated group/language, usually corresponding to the absolute 
majority and minority groups (Vetter, 2015, p. 106). Despite criticism on Nelde’s law, there is a clear 
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consensus in the field that language contact very often results in language conflict (cf. Jahr (1993), and 
Fraenkel and Kramer (1993)).  
However, it is not the contact between different language varieties that leads to the conflict: the 
linguistic differences are the more visible signs of underlying tensions between different linguistic 
groups, usually due to differences in social status, economic position, prestige etc. These socio-
economic differences become associated with the linguistic differences and thus linguistic differences 
become a symbol for the conflict between the different groups. Therefore, language conflicts are also 
referred to as ‘umgeleitete Sozialkonflikte’ (diverted social conflicts) (Mattheier as quoted in 
Darquennes (2015, p. 12)).  
Because the socio-economic and historical circumstances are different in each situation, Kramer 
(1993) distinguishes between different ‘faces’ of language conflicts: the conflict can be a language 
internal conflict between different varieties or standards of one language (cf. Mackridge (2012) on the 
conflict between different standards of Greek and Bull (1993) on the conflict between different 
standards in Norway), but it can also be an interaction between two languages or language varieties 
within a state (cf. Darquennes (2010) on minority languages in a European context), or it can be an 
intergroup conflict (cf. Bugarski (2012) on the languages, identities and borders in the Serbo-Croatian 
area). This latter ‘face’ of language conflict is similar to the situation in Ukraine: a military conflict 
between two groups, who stereotypically speak different language varieties.  
Following the general trend in linguistics studies, the traditional approaches to conflict linguistics have 
been criticized in recent years for using macro-categories like ‘standard language’ and a ‘minority’ 
versus a ‘dominant language’ (Darquennes, 2015; Vetter, 2015). These categories do not take into 
account all the possible variations and combinations in language use and identification, i.e. the super-
diversity (Vertovec, 2007), that can be distinguished when analyzing a language conflict at a micro-
level, as, for example, Janssens did in his study of the language situation in Brussels (Janssens, 
2015).(Janssens, 2015)(Janssens, 2015) 
Conflict resolution: language planning 
Whenever languages are in contact and a conflict arises, the tensions can be solved by applying 
language planning. However, as Jahr remarks: ‘language planning activity may itself ultimately be the 
cause of serious problems as well as major conflicts’(Jahr, 1993, p. 1). There are (as of yet) no clear 
guidelines or universal solutions how to de-escalate a language conflict (Spolsky, 2012), but scholars 
in the academic field of language planning and policy, often abbreviated to LPP, are committed to 
describing different language situations and analyzing what kind of policies are successful. The 
description of the language situation is based on a language ecology, a framework developed by 
Haugen that does not only contain data on actual language use, language ideologies, and legislation, 
but also includes a historical, social, and geographical background (Dil, 1972). Most studies focus on 
language policy and planning at the level of a state or international bodies like the EU, but recently 
smaller levels of language ‘governing’ have also been included,  see for example Liddicoat and 
Baldauf (2008) on language policy at a local level, and Spolsky (2009) on language management in 
the family, religion, workplace, media, schools, health institutions and the military. In this thesis, 
language policy is defined as ‘an officially mandated set of rules for language use and form within a 
nation-state’ (Spolsky, 2012, p. 3).  
2.3 Other related fields 
Apart from conflict linguistics there are two other academic fields in which the language use and/or 
language policy in times of conflict are studied: translation studies and military studies.  
A certain branch within translation studies is focused on translators who work in conflict situations; 
these studies  mostly discuss ethical issues translators face (cf. Salama-Carr (2007) and Stahuljak 
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(2010)).  Military studies recently also started to do research on language use and policy in 
international peace-keeping missions; an overview of this field can be found in the book by Hilary 
Foottit and Michael Kelly, ‘Languages at war’ (2012). However, the research of this thesis does not 
touch upon these fields and thus they will not be discussed in detail.  
2.4 Language and identity 
After discussing the different theories and angles of research on language conflict and conflict 
linguistics, this section will address the relationship between language and identity. Even though the 
focus of this thesis is on conflict and language, ‘the issues of group identity and linguistic allegiance 
are paramount [in each case of language conflict]’ (Kramer, 1993, p. 3). Language and identity are two 
closely related terms; in fact, language is often taken as one of the most important markers of a 
person’s identity, both their personal identity, i.e. their ethnicity, and their group identity, i.e. the 
nation to which they belong (Edwards, 2009). This view is part of the objectivist school of ethnicity 
that argues that concrete cultural institutions and patterns such as language and clothing define a 
person’s ethnicity (Ross, 1979). It is indeed true that many ethnic groups have their own distinct 
languages, but there are also distinct ethnic groups that share a common language: ‘ethnic differences 
do not always find parallels in linguistic differences and vice versa’ (Lieberson as quoted in Appel & 
Muysken (2006, p. 15)). The subjectivist school of ethnicity accounts for this apparent lack of shared 
cultural institutions within certain ethnic groups by viewing ethnicity as defined by a subjective 
feeling of belonging, a shared us-feeling or us-against-them-feeling, which can override differences in 
other objective factors that are not shared, such as language (Ross, 1979). In this thesis the following 
definition of ethnicity will be used: ‘ethnicity refers to an involuntary group of people who share the 
same culture or to descendants of such people who identify themselves and/or are identified by others 
as belonging to the same involuntary group’ (Isajiw as quoted in Edwards (2009, pp. 161-162)). 
Language and nationalism 
As mentioned earlier, language is not only connected to ethnicity, but also to nationalism. Parallel to 
the two schools of ethnicity, there are also two types of nationalism: ethnic nationalism, which 
promotes the idea that all those sharing the same ethnicity should be part of one nation (usually in the 
sense of those sharing primordial characteristics such as parental lineage and language); and civic 
nationalism, which is ‘based on the voluntary association of individual citizens who agree to live 
according to common values and laws. […] The nation itself is seen as an autonomous legal-political 
community, defined by common territory, shared civic history and common laws, its members united 
by a common public culture’ (Smith, 2007, p. 325). This distinction implies that civic nationalism is 
good and desirable, while ethnic nationalism is bad because it is exclusive, i.e. only those belonging to 
the same ethnic group can be included in the nation; civic nationalism is supposedly morally superior 
because it is open to all members of society, whatever language they speak or whoever their parents 
are (Edwards, 2009, pp. 175-180). Brubaker criticizes this stance by problematizing the terms 
‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’: it can be argued that civic nationalism is equally exclusive to those who 
are not legal citizens of a state, like refugees, as ethnic nationalism is exclusive to those who speak a 
different language (Brubaker, 2004, pp. 141-144). 
Continuing the thought that language and identity are linked, some people go even further and argue 
that language is pivotal for the survival and also right to existence of a people or nation, an idea that 
has been very popular since the late 18
th
 century (Edwards, 2009, pp. 205-206). When people get the 
feeling that their language is under threat, for example when their native language becomes 
marginalized, efforts will be made to ‘protect’ the language by purist and prescriptivist actions (for a 
detailed overview of prescriptivism across time and space see Tieken-Boon van Ostade and Percy 
(2017)). However, the aim of this language protectionism is not only to protect the language but to 
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protect ‘identity’ in general, especially if there is a strong relationship between language and identity 
in a certain community (Edwards, 2009, pp. 212-216). Continuing this thought, it is likely that if the 
connections between a national language and the legitimization of a nation are strong, a threat to the 
nation will also lead to language protection. 
Apart from the close relation with ethnicity and nationalism, language is also connected with other 
parts of identity, for example religion and regional identity (cf. Edwards (2009)). Not all these 
identities are relevant for this research, so they will not be discussed here. However, it is important to 
note that because language and different forms of identity are linked, certain stereotypes develop as 
people start associating a certain language variety with a particular identity; the development of these 
associations leads to certain attitudes towards speakers of that language variety and as a result, 
different language varieties express more or less prestige and power independently from the personal 
identity of the speaker (Appel & Muysken, 2006, p. 16).  
2.5 Main theoretical concepts 
Divergence (Accommodation Theory) 
Accommodation Theory (AT) describes how and why people seem adjust their speech depending on 
(the speech of) their interlocutor, in other words how and why they accommodate. Giles (1973) argues 
that accommodation can happen in two directions: convergence and divergence. Convergence is a 
strategy used by a speaker to stress the similarities between themselves and the addressee, for example 
to receive the addressee’s approval and to establish a common group identity. The strategy of 
divergence is the opposite: it stresses the differences and dissimilarities between the interlocutors and 
thus creates distance between them. Speakers can use divergence to dissociate themselves from their 
interlocutor and to show that they do not belong to the same group. The changes in speech can be 
small - in AT they are usually confined to slight changes in pronunciation or accent - and interlocutors 
might not be consciously aware of them (Giles, 1973). However, for bilingual interlocutors 
accommodation can be a change in language; a bilingual can switch to the language of the addressee, 
for instance because the addressee does not understand the first language of the speaker in which case 
accommodation has a communicative goal. When interlocutors are both bi- or multilingual, language 
choice also expresses their attitudes towards each other, and strategies of divergence and convergence 
can be used to indicate the social distance between the speakers (Sachdev, Giles, & Pauwels, 2013). 
For example, Gasiorek and Vincze (2016) found that by speaking only the minority language Swedish, 
even when addressed in the majority language Finnish, speakers stress their belonging to the Swedish 
minority group. In this case, not switching to the majority language is already a strategy of divergence. 
In Ukraine many people have a strong competence in both Ukrainian and Russian (at least passively), 
and thus language competence is usually not the cause for switching languages. Strategies of non-
accommodation are indeed fairly common, especially in the capital Kyiv and on TV-shows (Bilaniuk, 
2010). However, according to Bilaniuk non-accommodation is not necessarily a strategy of divergence 
in the Ukrainian context, but rather a method by which interlocutors can give expression to the equal 
status of both languages and the right of each individual speaker to use the language of their own 
preference. Nevertheless, language choice does often reflect a person’s ethnic and political affiliations, 
and thus it can be used to stress the (dis)similarities between interlocutors (ibid.). This complicates the 
model of AT, as in Ukraine non-accommodation is not necessarily a strategy of divergence. However, 
this thesis will test whether strategies of divergence (including non-accommodation) have possibly 
become more common in Ukraine in the last few years, for instance because those who support the 
Ukrainian side in the war want to diverge from their Russian speaking ‘enemies’. 
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Intentional language change 
Traditionally language change is seen as ‘inexorable’: something that is not controlled by the speakers 
of a language (Thomason, 2006). Within historical linguistics the regularity of language change, i.e. 
the existence of sound laws, stipulates that language change cannot be influenced intentionally by an 
individual or group. But Thomason argues that ‘deliberate and conscious decisions taken by speakers 
can be shown to be responsible for nontrivial changes in various grammatical subsystems in numerous 
languages’ (2006, p. 347). First and foremost language is deliberately changed during campaigns of 
language planning, especially during standardization efforts: language agencies or academies often 
strongly advocate the use of certain linguistic features over others, mostly in vocabulary but there are 
examples of structural changes as well. Another type of deliberate language change can be found in 
slang which contains numerous conscious lexical innovations. Lastly, deliberate language change can 
be motivated by ‘a concern to emphasize a group’s identity vis-à-vis some other group(s)’(Thomason, 
2006, p. 347).This type of change can also be a part of language planning, but it rarely involves 
official or governmental agencies. It is likely that Ukrainians currently also want to emphasize their 
group’s identity vis-á-vis the Russian identity and thus are motivated to intentionally change their 
language use.  
Indexicality 
As already discussed, the use of certain language varieties can be associated with certain groups of 
speakers, for example an ethnic group. Speakers can also consciously use a certain language variety or 
linguistic form to express an identity that is associated with that language variety, i.e. they can index 
an identity by their language use (Bassiouney, 2015, p. 58). According to Johnstone et al. (2006, p. 
81)() ‘[the] relationships between linguistic forms and social meaning can stabilize at various levels of 
abstraction or ‘orders of indexicality’’. These orders of indexicality were developed by Silverstein 
(2003) and describe the relations between language and social meaning in an increasingly abstract 
order. The first order of indexicality reflects the more direct relations between local, demographic 
identities and language use, for example to index place of origin (Johnstone et al., 2006, p. 78); the 
linguistic  differences at this level are usually not consciously noticed or performed. The second order 
of indexicality requires more awareness and is more abstract: it is based on language ideologies and 
correlations with speech styles (Bassiouney, 2015, p. 60). In a conflict situation such as in Ukraine, it 
is likely that the awareness of linguistic differences between the people on opposite sides of the 
conflict increases. The increased awareness can become a trigger to change one’s language use so that 
it is in better accordance with the social meaning that is indexed by this language use.   
 
Using the concepts of divergence, intentional language change, and indexicality this thesis will 
analyze whether the language use and language attitudes of Ukrainians have changed since violent 
conflict erupted in 2014. It is expected that they will feel the need to strengthen their group identity 
and distance themselves from Russian by deliberately changing their language use.    
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3. Background: linguistic situation Ukraine 
In order to properly understand the recent developments and the current linguistic situation in Ukraine, 
a general background of the country and the main linguistic developments up to 2014 will be given in 
this chapter. Ukraine is located on the steppe lands in the east of Europe, north of the Black Sea. It has 
been an independent country since 1991 and has a population of about 45 million people. The land 
presently belonging to Ukraine has often been split up and different parts for many years belonged to 
different (super)powers, e.g. the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Russian Empire. The 
southeastern regions already became a part of the Russian Empire in the 18
th
 century, but the 
westernmost regions were still part of Poland, Romania and the Austro-Hungarian Empire until the 
end of the Second World War. After 1945, the Ukrainian lands as we know them now were united as 
the Socialist Soviet Republic (SSR) of Ukraine, which was part of the Soviet Union. The Crimean 
peninsula has a very different historical development from the rest of Ukraine
1
 and was added to the 
Ukrainian SSR only in 1954. However, since 2014 the peninsula is de facto part of the Russian 
Federation. Due to the fact that Crimea is currently disputed territory, it is no longer included in 
Ukrainian nationwide surveys, which makes it hard to objectively discern what the current linguistic 
situation is. Therefore its linguistic peculiarities will not be treated in this thesis.  
3.1 Language ecology 
The two main languages of Ukraine are Ukrainian and Russian, two closely related East Slavic 
languages. According to the latest Census (2001) they are spoken natively by 68% and 30% of the 
citizens of Ukraine respectively, while 2% of the population has another native language. The 
Ukrainian and Russian standard languages arose from the East Slavic dialect continuum, and the 
dialects spoken on the territory of Ukraine still reflect that continuum: western Ukrainian dialects 
share many features with Polish, and northeastern Ukrainian dialects share features with standard 
Russian (Bilaniuk, 2004, pp. 412-413, 417-418). 
As a result of the different historical developments of the eastern and western regions of Ukraine, the 
language use and attitudes differ significantly. After more than 250 years of Russian domination, the 
southeastern regions of Ukraine have had a much more significant influx of Russian settlers and a 
stronger dominance of the Russian language than the western regions. Therefore a significant part of 
the population in the eastern regions is ethnic Russian and/or speaks Russian natively. In the west, 
Polish (and to some extent Romanian, Hungarian and German) have been the language(s) of the elite, 
and today small pockets of speakers of these languages remain in the border areas. However, these 
minorities total no more than 1% of the population of Ukraine according to the 2001 Census. Figure 1 
and Figure 2 provide an overview of the spread of Ukrainian as a native language and ethnic 
Ukrainians. In most regions the percentage of Ukrainian speakers and the percentage of Russian 
speakers add up to 95-100% so that if the percentage for Ukrainian is high, the percentage for Russian 
is low and vice versa. The main exceptions are the regions along the western border where native 
language and identity are from northwest to south: Polish, Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian.  
As already mentioned (and clearly visible in Figure 1 and Figure 2), both the Russian language and a 
Russian identity are hardly present in western Ukraine, but have a strong presence in southern and 
eastern regions. Furthermore, a close look at the figures shows that in almost every region the dot that 
represents the main city or cities of that region is of a (slightly) lighter color than the surrounding area, 
                                                     
1
 Crimea has never been part of Poland or Lithuania. From the 15th until the 18th century it was the center of the Crimean 
Khanate and inhabited by a majority of (Crimean) Tatars. In the 18th century it was annexed by the Russian empire and over 
time the Crimean Tatar population was slowly replaced by Russian settlers, until Stalin ordered the deportation of all 
Crimean Tatars to Siberia in 1943 after which ethnic Russians became the vast majority. Ukrainians have always formed a 
(small) minority on the peninsula as opposed to all other regions of the country where they form a majority, see for more 
details Magosci (2007). 
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indicating that every city is less Ukrainophone than the surrounding countryside. This fits with the 
historical development of Ukraine: in western regions the elite (mostly living in the cities) was not 
Ukrainian, but belonged to a regional (super)power, thus leading the stronger presence of a language 
like Polish in the city than on the countryside; in eastern regions, on the other hand, migration patterns 
account for the difference: the industrialization in these regions was accompanied by migrants who 
mainly came from Russia, and thus the cities in the east have a stronger presence of Russian.  
A comparison of the Census data from 1989 and 2001 shows that there is an increase in the number of 
citizens declaring Ukrainian as their native language following independence: in 1989 33% of the 
population declared Russian as their native language against 30% in 2001, while Ukrainian was 
declared as native language by 65% in 1989, but by 68% in 2001 (All-Ukrainian Census 1989: 
national and linguistic affiliations, 1989; All-Ukrainian Census 2001: national and linguistic 
affiliations, 2001). The increased use of Ukrainian is also visible in the results of several sociological 
polls cited by Moser (2013, pp. 49-50) that show that the declared use of Ukrainian at home increased 
from 37% in1992 to 42% in 2011, but Moser stresses that the use of Russian increased even more in 
this period from 29% to 39% (at the expense of those reporting to use both Russian and Ukrainian). 
 
 
Figure 1: percentage of inhabitants declaring Ukrainian as native language according to the 2001 Census. 
 
Figure 2: percentage of inhabitants with Ukrainian ethnicity according to the 2001 Census. 
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The intense contact between Russian and Ukrainian has resulted in mixed varieties that are often 
referred to by the term ‘Surzhyk’ (literally ‘impure language’). Surzhyk has a strong connotation of 
being a non-language and its speakers are often seen as backward by both Ukrainians and Russians 
(Bilaniuk, 2005, pp. 103-141). Surzhyk has become an umbrella term for many different types of 
mixed language use: it can refer to the mixed speech that is spoken natively by Ukrainians in certain 
areas, the code-switching of bilinguals, and the interference of one’s native language when speaking 
the other language (for a detailed typology of the different kinds of Surzhyk see Bilaniuk (2004)). 
Moreover, by the majority of contemporary Ukrainians even many rural dialects are perceived as 
Surzhyk or as containing many Russian elements, especially the southeastern dialects (Del Gaudio, 
2010). Because practically every language monitoring and all surveys do not take dialects and Surzhyk 
into account, very little is known about their usage. Whenever the sources mention dialects or Surzhyk 
it will be included, but the analysis will mostly focus on the Ukrainian and Russian standard 
languages.   
As Ukrainians were divided over different states for many centuries, multiple standards were 
developed. Up until the formation of the Soviet Union, the western ‘Galician’ standard and the eastern 
standard competed (Shevelov, 1980, pp. 153-154). Furthermore, the use of Ukrainian was often 
restricted or partly forbidden: for example, it was forbidden to print Ukrainian books and to speak 
Ukrainian in public in the Russian Empire in the 19
th
 century (Bilaniuk, 2005, pp. 74-78). In the 20
th
 
century, periods of Russification/Polonization alternated with short intervals of Ukrainization, the 
latter mostly during the short-lived independence in 1918-1920 and the ‘korenizacija’ (nativization) 
policy in the twenties. During the periods of Russification, not only was the use and knowledge of 
Russian promoted at the cost of Ukrainian, efforts were also made to assimilate the Ukrainian 
language to Russian by altering the grammar and vocabulary to make it more similar (see for examples 
Bilaniuk (2005, pp. 86-93)). Following independence in 1991, the norms of the standard are again 
debated as some people now want to undo the previous waves of Russification (Del Gaudio, 2015, pp. 
151-153). However, these changes are not part of the official language policy, as will be discussed in 
more detail in section 3.3. 
3.2 Language practices and ideologies  
As already mentioned in the previous section and illustrated by Figure 1 and Figure 2, the use of 
Russian and Ukrainian is not evenly spread across the country: Ukrainian is the native language and 
ethnicity in the west, center and in rural areas, while Russian is most strongly present in the east, 
south, and in cities. The uneven spread of languages over rural and urban areas corresponds to the 
stereotypical representation of the Ukrainian language as a ‘farmer language’, and Russian as the 
language of development and higher prestige (Bilaniuk, 2005, pp. 79, 90-91). Somewhat less apparent 
in Figure 1 and Figure 2 is the fact that a significant part (almost 15%) of ethnic Ukrainians does not 
speak Ukrainian natively but Russian, and a small part of ethnic Russians speaks Ukrainian natively, 
see Table 1. So even though ethnic Ukrainians in general speak Ukrainian and ethnic Russians 
Russian, this is not true for everyone.  
 
Nationality Native language Ukrainian Native language Russian 
Ukrainian 85% 15% 
Russian 4% 96% 
Table 1: native language per nationality according to the 2001 Census. 
However, the figures from the 2001 Census do not necessarily reflect the actual use of Ukrainian and 
Russian in Ukraine today. Not only are the data 16 years old, the use of the term ‘ridna mova’ (native 
language, Russian ‘rodnoj jazyk’) is also problematic as its meaning is ambiguous: participants in the 
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Census have interpreted this term in very different ways, including as the language in which they think 
and can speak fluently or the language of the nationality to which they belong (see Moser (2013, pp. 
45-46) for a discussion of this ambiguity). Many ethnic Ukrainians therefore listed Ukrainian as 
‘native language’ while they do not actually speak it, which means other data are needed to analyze 
the actual language use. Several surveys held by sociological research institutes included questions on 
which language(s) people mainly use in certain domains and the results of these survey indicate that 
the use of Russian is much more widespread than the Census data on native language would suggest 
and in some polls almost equals the use of Ukrainian (Stanovyšče ukraïns’koï movy v Ukraïni v 2012 
roci. Povnyj tekst, 2012).  
Another source for information on the actual use of Ukrainian and Russian in Ukraine is the language 
monitoring by the NGO Prostir Svobody. The results of the monitoring in 2012 and 2013 indicate that 
Russian is the dominant language in most domains in the southeastern regions of Ukraine, and in the 
media and the provision of information and services nationwide. Ukrainian, on the other hand, is 
dominant in all domains in the western regions and in the spheres of education and official (state) 
signage nationwide (Stanovyšče ukraïns’koï movy v Ukraïni v 2012 roci. Povnyj tekst, 2012; 
Stanovyšče Ukraïns’koï movy v Ukraïni v 2012 roci. Prezentacija, 2012; Stanovyšče Ukraïns’koï movy 
v Ukraïni v 2013 roci. Prezentacija, 2013). This means that while on almost all train stations the 
official information relays are in the Ukrainian language, only in half of them does the personnel 
respond in Ukrainian to a question asked in that language (cf. Figure 4 in section 4.1 where a more 
detailed overview of the results of the monitoring before and after 2014 will be given).  
The use of both Ukrainian and Russian is common in many regions in Ukraine, especially in the 
central regions. This has resulted in the popularity of the practice of ‘non-accommodation’, which, as 
already discussed in the previous chapter (Bilaniuk, 2005, pp. 175-177). Since it is expected that each 
citizen of Ukraine has at least passive knowledge of both Ukrainian and Russian, non-accommodation 
allows speakers to use the language they prefer underlining the equal status of the languages and 
pertaining to the ideology that languages should not be mixed (each speaker can speak ‘pure’, non-
mixed language) (ibid.). Non-accommodation further illustrates the fact that in Ukraine speakers of 
different languages interact peacefully and little discrimination based on language use is reported 
(research by Hromads’ka Dumka found that a majority of Ukrainians has never experienced 
discrimination of Russian speakers by Ukrainian speakers (74%), or vice versa of Ukrainian speakers 
by Russian speakers (67%) (Masenko, 2009, pp. 117-119)). Interestingly, more people witnessed 
discrimination of Ukrainian speakers than of Russian speakers, but it confirms what is also argued by 
Moser (2013, pp. 46-47): that the Ukrainian language is in some respects similar to a minority 
language in that its use is still frowned upon or seen as ‘marked’ behavior in several regions.  
 
Even though in day-to-day conversations both languages coexist peacefully, the language ideologies 
people adhere to are often opposing: on the one hand there are supporters of Russification, who want 
to restore the previous prestige of the Russian language within Ukraine; on the other hand there are 
Ukrainian nationalists, who see the Ukrainian language as the only language for the Ukrainian nation-
state. Furthermore, there are many variations in between: some people prefer an extended use of 
Ukrainian or Russian; others support different forms of bilingualism (Bilaniuk, 2005, pp. 93-102; 
Kulyk, 2009, pp. 18-22). It is important to note that the kind of language policy people claim to 
support does not necessarily coincide with what they would see as the preferred outcome: some groups 
claim to support ‘bilingualism’, but in effect they are proponents of the continued dominance of the 
Russian language (Moser, 2013, pp. 69-70). 
15 
 
3.3 Language policy 
Language policy in Ukraine is a sensitive topic because the strengthening of the Ukrainian language 
and the recognition of Russian lie at the heart of many people’s national identity (Bilaniuk, 2015). 
While there may be peaceful coexistence in everyday communication, language ideologies are almost 
diametrically opposed, which has resulted in many demonstrations on the street and even fights in 
parliament (Elder, 2012). Despite, or maybe because of this, the official language policy of Ukraine is 
mostly maintaining the status quo and not making substantial changes to strengthen the position of 
either Ukrainian or Russian. From independence until 2010 the use of Ukrainian was stimulated, 
especially in education and state institutions, but in most other domains, such as media and business, 
Russian remained the dominant language (Bilaniuk, 2005, pp. 93-102; Kulyk, 2009, pp. 18-22). 
The lack of a clear central policy resulted in regional differences in the implementation of various 
language policies. In the west, most schools became Ukrainian language schools, but Russian schools 
remain available and most Ukrainian language schools also offered Russian as a ‘foreign language’ 
(Janmaat, 2000; Wylegała, 2010, pp. 33-34). However, in the eastern regions of Donec’k and 
Luhans’k, less than half of the pupils were attending a Ukrainian language school in 2012 (Stanovyšče 
ukraïns’koï movy v Ukraïni v 2012 roci. Povnyj tekst, 2012).  
Under president Janukovyč (2010-2014) state support for Ukrainian declined and in 2012 a new law 
on languages was adopted. This law states that: ‘a language can become an official regional language 
if at least 10% of the inhabitants of the region declare that language to be their native language’. The 
law and its adoption were highly disputed and there were fierce demonstrations against it in western 
Ukraine. Many feared that this law would undermine the position of Ukrainian, especially in those 
regions where its position was already weak, as it gave Russian speakers an excuse not to learn 
Ukrainian at all. The law was also criticized by international institutions like the Venice Commission 
and the OSCE, mainly because it would in effect support only the Russian language and to some 
extent Hungarian and Romanian, but not small minority languages like Bulgarian and Greek. 
However, in southeastern regions the law was met with joy, and many city and regional councils 
adopted Russian as their official language (Moser, 2013, pp. 269-290, 297-312, 385-395, 413-417).  
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4 Developments in the language situation since 2014 
This chapter will discuss empirical data as well as recent language monitoring and surveys to 
investigate whether these data point to changes in the language use and language attitudes in the last 
three years and whether these changes are related to the outbreak of violent conflict. This analysis will 
provide preliminary answers to the research questions that will be compared to the results of the thesis 
survey and fieldwork in chapter 6. 
4.1 Recent changes in language use 
In order to see whether the reported language use has changed since 2014 it is best to compare the 
results of nationwide surveys held before and after 2014. Both Prostir Svobody and Razumkov Center 
have continued doing nationwide monitoring and surveys using the same questions and 
methodologies, which ensures an optimal comparability of the results. However, due to the conflict 
some parts of the territory of Ukraine were not under the control of Ukrainian authorities during this 
period, and surveys taken at different points in time do not necessarily cover the same territory. Unless 
specified otherwise, the survey results that are compared here will cover the same territories, meaning 
they most likely do not include Crimea and (part of) Donec’k and Luhans’k Oblasts.  
In December 2015 and March 2017 Razumkov Center held nationwide surveys in which they asked 
respondents about their language use at home and outside of their home. Comparing the results to a 
poll held by the Research & Branding Group (R&BG), it seems that there is an increase in the use of 
Ukrainian and also in the use of both languages, while there is a decrease in the use of Russian (see 
also Figure 3). However, unfortunately the results of the 2011 survey are not split up per region and 
they do include Crimea and Donec’k and Luhans’k Oblasts, while the surveys from 2015 and 2017 do 
not. Thus, it is not clear to which extent the relative increase of people who speak mostly Ukrainian is 
due to an absolute increase of people speaking Ukrainian or merely a result of the exclusion of the 
three regions with the highest number of Russian speakers (according to the census). However, the 
changes between 2015 and 2017 cannot be the result of a difference in the regional coverage of the 
surveys, which means that the relative increase in the use of Ukrainian over this period is an indication 
that more Ukrainians are reporting to speak Ukrainian inside and outside of their homes.  
 
 
Figure 3: language use at home and outside the home 2011-2015-2017 (Osnovni zasady ta šljaxy formuvannja spil’noï 
identyčnosti hromadjan ukraïny, 2017; Osoblyvosti identyčnosti okremyx movnyx i nacional’nyx hrup, 2016; Stanovyšče 
ukraïns’koï movy v Ukraïni v 2012 roci. Povnyj tekst, 2012). 
Within the domain of education Ukrainian is still the dominant language, and the statistics show an 
increase of 8% (from 82% to 90% ) in pupils receiving education with Ukrainian as the language of 
instruction (Stanovyšče Ukraïns’koï movy v Ukraïni v 2016 roci. Analityčnyj ohljad, 2016). However, 
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in his blog at the Portal of Language Policy Stanislav Svidlov shows that this increase is only the 
effect of the exclusion of Crimea and parts of Donec’k and Luhans’k Oblasts from these statistics: if 
Crimea, Donec’k Oblast and Luhans’k Oblast are excluded from the pre-2014 data, the percentage of 
pupils having Ukrainian as the language of instruction is a stable 91% over the period 2012-2016 
(Svidlov, 2017). However, Svidlov also shows that there are significant changes in the number of 
pupils learning Russian: while from 2012 to 2014  half of the pupils studied Russian the percentage 
decreased sharply to 36% in the 2016-2017 school year (Svidlov, 2017).  
 
 
Figure 4: language use in the media and in the sphere of information and services 2012-2016 (Stanovyšče ukraïns’koï 
movy v Ukraïni v 2012 roci. Povnyj tekst, 2012; Stanovyšče Ukraïns’koï movy v Ukraïni v 2014-15 rokax. Analityčnyj 
ohljad (infohrafika), 2015; Stanovyšče Ukraïns’koï movy v Ukraïni v 2016 roci. Analityčnyj ohljad, 2016). 
Monitoring by Prostir Svobody further indicates that in the domains of media and information  
provision there is also a decrease in the use of Russian (see also Figure 4). However, in the media 
Russian is still clearly the dominant language: two out of three newspapers and three out of four 
journals printed in Ukraine in 2016 were in Russian, and 69% of the monitored TV content was fully 
or partially in Russian. At first glance, the graph seems to indicate a substantial decrease of Russian 
from 50% in 2013 to 34% in 2016, but, due to an increase in the bilingual content from 18% to 35%, 
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Russian is still used more than Ukrainian, and the increase of Ukrainian occurs only alongside 
Russian. The data from the sphere of information and services in Figure 4 are only based on the 
monitoring of mainland Ukraine excluding (most of) Donec’k and Luhans’k Oblasts2, and thus 
differences in percentages can only express changes in observed language use.  In 2016 the responses 
of restaurant staff were 10% more in Ukrainian and the availability of a menu in Ukrainian increased 
with 7%. The information provision at train and bus stations has also become more Ukrainian: the 
official signage is now for over 90% in Ukrainian. However, the language in which personnel 
responds to a question asked in Ukrainian did not change much and at bus stations the monitoring 
even shows an increase of responses in Russian from 13% in 2012 to 17% in 2015. 
Apart from the increased use of Ukrainian indicated by the surveys and monitoring mentioned above, 
there is also a surge in grassroots movements supporting and popularizing the use of Ukrainian 
following the Euromaidan revolution (Bilaniuk, 2016a). Some of those movements encourage 
Ukrainians to learn (more pure) Ukrainian, others to speak it more, and some assist Russian speakers 
in switching to Ukrainian in everyday life. An example is ‘Perexod’ na ukraïns’ku’ (switch to 
Ukrainian), an initiative that shares stories of Russian speakers who switched to Ukrainian and tries to 
encourage others to follow their example ("Perexod' na ukraïns'ku,"). The popularity of such language 
movements is a further indication that the use of Ukrainian is increasing, thus supporting the data of 
the surveys and the monitoring discussed above.  
4.2 Recent changes in language attitudes 
There are not as many detailed surveys on language attitudes as there are on language use, especially 
not ones asking the same questions before and after 2014. However, in 2016 Volodymyr Kulyk 
published an article in which he discusses the results of a survey in which people were asked whether 
their attitudes towards the Ukrainian and Russian languages had changed in the previous year (i.e. 
2014). He shows that the majority of the population did not report changes in their language attitudes, 
but those who reported changes, mostly reported a more positive attitude towards Ukrainian and a 
more negative attitude towards Russian (Kulyk, 2016), see Figure 5. A more positive attitude was also 
reported for the Ukrainian flag and anthem, and according to Kulyk, the similar development of these 
national symbols of Ukraine indicates that Ukrainian is not just seen as the legal official language, but 
as the language of the Ukrainian nation. The worsening in the attitude towards the Russian language 
was most strongly in the western regions, while in some eastern regions there was a worsening in 
attitudes towards Ukrainian. Focus group discussions confirmed that these changes are often due to the 
negative sentiments stemming from the current conflict (Kulyk, 2016, pp. 599-602). 
 
 
Figure 5: answers to the question: 'How has your attitude towards the following changed for the last year?' from a 
survey held by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in September 2014 (Kulyk, 2016, p. 599). 
In their nationwide surveys Razumkov Center frequently asks respondents how they think the 
Ukrainian and Russian languages should coexist in Ukraine, i.e. what status they should have on the 
national and regional level. Figure 6 shows the results of surveys taken in 2005, 2012, and 2015. It is 
                                                     
2
 The data on the language use in restaurants do include the monitoring in the city of Mariupol’ in Donec’k 
Oblast in both 2012 and 2016. The data on language use on train and bus stations do not include any city in 
Donec’k or Luhans’k Oblasts in both 2012 and 2015. 
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striking how over these years the support for Ukrainian as the sole state and official language has 
grown, whereas the percentage of people in favor of two state languages has declined from 37% in 
2005 to 14% in 2015. However, in the results for 2015 Crimea and Donec’k and Luhans’k Oblasts are 
not included. As Crimea and Donec’k and Luhans’k Oblasts were the Ukrainian regions with the 
highest percentage of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, the exclusion of these regions will have 
contributed to the relative increase of support for Ukrainian as the only official state language in 2015. 
The 2015 Razumkov survey also asked a question about the prestige of the Russian and Ukrainian 
languages in respondents’ direct social environment, which was not included in previous surveys. 
Overall, 43% of the respondents said Ukrainian was more prestigious, and only 22% said Russian was 
more prestigious, but there were very strong regional differences: in the western regions Ukrainian 
was chosen as more prestigious by 88% , however, in Donec’k and Luhans’k Oblasts, Russian was 
considered more prestigious by 50% and Ukrainian by only 11% (Stanovyšče Ukraïns’koï movy v 
Ukraïni v 2016 roci. Analityčnyj ohljad, 2016). Thus, with regards to language ideology the opposition 
between supporters of Ukrainization, bilingualism, and Russification remains, but with a shift towards 
stronger support for Ukrainization. 
 
 
Figure 6: development of support for official status Russian and Ukrainian 2005-2015 (Moser, 2013, p. 66; 
Osoblyvosti identyčnosti okremyx movnyx i nacional’nyx hrup, 2016). 
Yet according to Bilaniuk (2016b) the opposition between supporters of Ukrainian and Russian is no 
longer the only dichotomy in the language attitudes of Ukrainians: since 2014 there is also an 
opposition between people for whom language practices and policy are very important, so to whom 
‘language matters’, and a group to whom ‘language does not matter’. This opposition is not just about 
whether or not it matters which language someone speaks, i.e. Ukrainian or Russian, but also the kind 
of language, i.e. whether it is the ‘pure’ and ‘correct’ form of the language or Surzhyk. There are many 
groups and initiatives on social media that are concerned with ‘correct’ language use; an example is 
the organization ‘Mova – DNK naciï’, that posts cartoons promoting correct language use on their 
website and social media pages ("Mova - DNK naciï," ; "Mova Facebook,") For those to whom 
language does not matter, it is not about the language you use but about what you say, not about the 
medium but the content. They mostly support a form of bilingualism, either because it is the status quo 
or because they reject the idea that a (nation-)state should be ethnolinguistically unitary (Bilaniuk, 
2015). For example, in June 2014 a group of bloggers founded the online platform ‘Repka Club’ 
where they publish blogs using many nonstandard linguistic forms including Surzhyk, and there are 
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several organizations uniting Russophone Ukrainian nationalists, who do not think that speaking 
Russian is an obstacle for Ukrainian nationalism ("Repka Club website," ; "RUN Facebook page,"). 
However, there are also Ukrainians who believe that the development of the national language and the 
development of the nation-state are intertwined, and for them the use of (the right kind of) Ukrainian is 
very important. Those people are mostly in favor of a comprehensive Ukrainization policy that will 
undo the previous Russification, which they believe is justified because it will merely correct the 
historical wrongdoings of the Russian and Soviet ‘occupation’ of Ukraine; even though they do not 
advocate the prohibition of the Russian language, many would prefer a monolingual Ukrainian state. 
Moreover, many adhere to an extensive narrative in which the bond between language and nation is 
elaborated. This bond includes, for example, the idea that if the language is weak, the nation will be 
weak, and as long as the language thrives, so will the state. These strong associations between 
language, identity, nationalism, and the state can subsequently be interpreted as causations: by 
speaking Ukrainian, you are supporting not just linguistic independence but the sovereignty of the 
Ukrainian state in general. Following this narrative, speaking Ukrainian becomes a weapon in the war 
against Russia, but at the same time these ideas make the use of Russian in Ukraine problematic. If 
speaking Ukrainian equals building a strong Ukrainian state and supporting its independence, then 
speaking Russian, the language of the enemy and (former) occupier, would equal supporting the 
Russian state or conceding to your (former) Russian masters like a slave. For some nationalists the 
Ukrainian language is not only a symbol for the Ukrainian state and nation, but also for democracy, 
European values and basically everything that is ‘good’, while the Russian language is a symbol for 
the Russian state, the enemy, totalitarianism and corruption. An example of how these ideas are 
expressed in social media can be found in Figure 7, a picture in which Russophone Ukrainian 
patriotism is discredited as a form of Ukrainian patriotism that covertly enables Russia to infiltrate 
Ukraine.  
   
Figure 7: a picture shared on Ukrainian social media with the caption: Russophone Ukrainian patriotism ("Mova 
Facebook,"). 
The idea that speaking Russian actually enables Russia to infiltrate Ukraine is derived from Russian 
propaganda surrounding the annexation of Crimea and the formation of the Donec’k and Luhans’k 
People’s Republics. As part of this propaganda, Russian authorities argued that Russian troops came to 
‘protect their Russian(speaking) compatriots’ in these regions and that they reserve the right to protect 
Russians in other regions in the future (Lally & Englund, 2014). Following this line of thought, 
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speaking Russian can be interpreted as an invitation for Russian troops. For a significant number of 
Russian speakers who switched to Ukrainian in 2014, this rhetoric was one of the main reasons to 
switch: ‘not to give the Russians an excuse to send their troops’ ("Perexod' na ukraïns'ku,"). 
4.3 Recent developments in language policy 
In February 2014, just days after president Janukovyč had fled the country, the Ukrainian parliament 
voted to abolish the 2012 language law. Even though this law was not abolished in the end (because 
acting President Turchynov vetoed it), this action resulted in widespread distrust of the new authorities 
in the east and south, and it can be seen as a contributor to the current conflict ("Johnson: different 
tongues, common homes," 2014). Following the elections of a new President and parliament in May 
and October 2014 respectively, the language policy has again been focused on maintaining the status 
quo. President Porošenko and his government advocate the strengthening of Ukrainian as the only 
official state language while guaranteeing the rights of speakers of all minority languages, a policy 
highly resembling the language policy before 2010 ("Jacenjuk propyše v Konstytuciï rosijs’ku movu 
dlja Donbasu," 2014; "Porošenko: v Ukraïni zavždy bude lyše odna deržavna mova," 2015; Syvačuk, 
2017). Since the 2012 language law is still in place, Russian is allowed to have official status on a 
regional level; this frustrates Ukrainian nationalists, but the President and government have not 
touched upon this issue, trying to strike a balance between supporters of Ukrainization and 
Russification and to prevent both from revolting against authorities (Babich, 2014). 
Nevertheless, civil society organizations are demanding more decisive changes to the existing laws on 
the status of languages and their use in public domains: by actively participating in writing and 
lobbying for new laws, they push the government towards more comprehensive Ukrainization policies. 
So far this has resulted in two laws providing language quotas for the use of Ukrainian on TV and in 
songs on the radio ("Pro vnesennja zmin do Zakonu Ukraïny "Pro telebačennja i radiomovlennja"," 
2016). In addition to these laws, the parliament currently reviews three comprehensive proposals on 
the status and use of the official state language, i.e. Ukrainian. The adoption of any one of these 
proposals would foresee in a full-scale Ukrainization, as all three impose quota for the use of 
Ukrainian in broadcast media and make it obligatory for all civil servants to be fluent in Ukrainian. 
These measures are not supported by everyone and there is a lot of criticism on the laws, especially 
from Russian speakers and representatives of linguistic minorities in Ukraine (Studennikova, 2017). 
According to the results of the 2015 survey by Razumkov Center, a large proportion (45%) of 
Ukrainians do not think the authorities have the right to restrict the use of non-state languages 
(compared to 33% who think it is within the rights of the authorities ("Osoblyvosti   identyčnosti   
okremyx   movnyx   i   nacional’nyx   hrup," 2017)), and a quota for Ukrainian in the media would 
inevitably restrict the use of Russian. Nevertheless, the results of that survey also show that there is 
broad support among the population for the strengthening and development of the Ukrainian language 
as the only official state language: 59% say authorities should promote Ukrainian regardless of how 
that affects other languages. Thus as long as the laws stipulate an increase in the share of Ukrainian as 
a result of which the share of Russian decreases, a majority of the population supports such measures; 
if, however, the formulation was the other way around, they would not support the measures. 
Summary 
The empirical research discussed in this chapter has provided a preliminary answer to the research 
question whether there have been changes in the language use and attitudes of Ukrainians: the analysis 
of data from before and after 2014 shows that there have been changes in the last three years. Most 
data point to an increase in the reported use of Ukrainian. It is hard to tell whether the changes in 
reported use reflect changes in actual language use, but the flourishing of all kinds of initiatives 
promoting and supporting the use of Ukrainian indicate that there is a stronger societal demand for the 
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use of Ukrainian. The stories shared on ‘Perexod’ na ukraïns’ku’ furthermore confirm that there is a 
group of Russian speakers who have switched to Ukrainian. There are also changes in language 
attitudes: the attitudes towards Ukrainian became more positive and there is now stronger support for 
its status as the only official state language; the attitudes towards Russian became somewhat more 
negative. For some people, the importance of the Ukrainian language for the Ukrainian identity and 
nation has increased: they are convinced that language matters a lot and therefore they have become 
active in the language initiatives to advocate for a stronger Ukrainization policy. However, there are 
also people for whom language does not matter and who are using Surzhyk and Russian irrespective of 
their political views, like the bloggers of Repka club.  
In the following chapter the results of the thesis survey and fieldwork will be treated and in chapter 6 
these results will be compared to the results of the empirical research discussed in this chapter.  
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5. Survey and Fieldwork 
As part of this thesis a survey on the language use and attitudes of Ukrainians was developed, and it 
was shared online in spring 2017. The optimal method for this research would have been to compare 
the results of a survey held before 2014 with a survey asking the same/similar questions after 2014. 
Unfortunately, such a survey was not carried out before 2014 and only the data from 2017 are 
available. To complement the quantitative data from the online survey, fieldwork was carried out 
during a trip to Ukraine in spring 2017, which included street surveys in four different cities as well as 
interviews with Ukrainians from different walks of life. The methodologies and results of the survey 
will be treated in section 5.1, followed by the methodologies and results of the fieldwork in sections 
5.2 and 5.3.  
5.1 Survey on language use and language attitudes 
5.1.1 Methodology 
In order to reach as many Ukrainians as possible from different regions, ages etc., an online survey 
was created and spread via Facebook. Of course, the Ukrainian community on Facebook is not 
representative for the whole Ukrainian society
3
, but it was the easiest platform to reach Ukrainians 
while being located in the Netherlands. The online survey was developed using Qualtrix.com and was 
shared on Facebook from February 15
th
 until March 1
st
, 2017. In total over a thousand people 
participated, 873 of whom completed all the questions. Only the data of respondents who completed 
the survey were included in the analysis.  
The survey was designed as follows: first some general questions were asked about age, gender and 
occupation, as well as questions on native language and ethnic identity; these were followed by more 
detailed questions on the knowledge of different languages and their usage; then some questions on 
language attitudes were asked including two questions about language change and finally respondents 
were asked about whether or not they agreed to 12 statements on language policy and language use 
(see Appendix 1 for the English translation of the survey). The survey was designed in English and 
then translated into Ukrainian and Russian. The translations were checked by native speakers to make 
sure the questions were clear and contained no grammatical mistakes. The idea was that the first 
screen would show a menu where respondents could choose the language of their preference, but this 
was impossible using the Qualtrix design. Instead there was a menu on the upper right side of the 
screen where respondents could alter the language settings. From several comments made by 
respondents it can be deducted that for some of them the default language was Ukrainian and for 
others it was Russian. Furthermore, it was not clear for all respondents that they could change the 
language settings as some added a comment saying that they became aware of this option only near 
the end of the survey. As the user language does not necessarily reflect the preference or choice of the 
respondents, it was decided not to take the language settings into account when analyzing the results.  
5.1.2 Respondents 
As already mentioned, 873 respondents completed the survey. The majority of the respondents are 
female and one third is male, see Table 2. This Table also shows the distribution of the respondents 
                                                     
3
 According to the website www.watcher.com.ua the number of Ukrainian Facebook users was 5,4 million in 
June 2016 (which is about 12% of the whole population). Furthermore, the statistical analysis of the website 
shows that in March 2017 the websites of VKontakte and Odnoklasnyky (other social media websites) were 
visited by a larger share of the Ukrainian internet users than Facebook http://watcher.com.ua/2017/04/13/olx-ta-
pryvatbank-obiyshly-facebook-za-misyachnym-ohoplennyam-internet-audytoriyi-v-ukrayini/. Finally, as Onuch 
(2015) mentions, the users of social media are mostly young and middle aged people, living in western or central 
regions of Ukraine, mostly professionals with high education, typically Russian-Ukrainian bilinguals, thus not a 
representative sample of the whole Ukrainian population. 
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over the five age groups: over half of the respondents are in the middle age group of 26 to 40, 
followed by a quarter aged 41 to 65, and one sixth aged 18 to 25. Because only a handful of 
respondents are younger than 18 or older than 65, these categories were merged into one group of 
those 25 and younger, and a group with respondents of 41 and older.  
 
 Male Female Other Total 
<18 2 1 1 4 
18-25 55 86 0 141 
26-40 171 305 1 477 
41-65 76 165 0 241 
>65 4 6 0 10 
Total 308 563 2 873 
Table 2: age and gender of the survey respondents. 
Almost all respondents completed higher education (94%), while the other respondents completed 
secondary education (5%), or primary education (less than 1%); 1% did not want to say.  
Because it was intended to do a detailed analysis based on the regional origin of respondents including 
their rural or urban background, it was considered useful to ask respondents an open question about 
their place of residence, so that one question would suffice for making different categorizations. 
However, as it was an open question, a number of respondents did not give their specific place of 
residence but instead answered ‘Ukraine’. Because these respondents could not be categorized in a 
specific region in Ukraine, they were included in the category ‘other’, see Table 3.  
 
 
Ethnic 
Ukrainian 
Ethnic 
Russian 
Bi-ethnic Other Total 
Western Ukraine 208 3 4 10 225 
Central Ukraine 375 16 25 38 454 
Southern Ukraine 26 1 1 1 29 
Eastern Ukraine 44 9 8 8 69 
Other 81 3 4 8 96 
Total 734 32 42 65 873 
Table 3: region of residence and ethnicity of survey respondents. 
Overall, more than half of the respondents reside in the central regions of Ukraine
4
; a quarter resides in 
western regions
5
; only 3% of the respondents are from the southern regions of Ukraine
6
; and 8% live 
in the eastern regions
7; 11% fall within the category ‘other’ including some respondents who did not 
declare a specific place of residence (within Ukraine), or who are currently living abroad, see Table 3 
for an overview of these data. This table also shows the ethnicity of the respondents: 84% report to be 
ethnic Ukrainians, a rather small minority declared to be ethnic Russian (3%), a slightly bigger group 
report to be both ethnic Ukrainian and ethnic Russian (5%), and 8% of the respondents have a 
different ethnic identity. 
                                                     
4
 Kyiv city, Kyïvs’ka Oblast, Žytomyrs’ka Oblast, Xmel’nyc’ka Oblast, Vinnyc’ka Oblast, Čerkas’ka Oblast, 
Kirovohrads’ka Oblast, Poltavs’ka Oblast, Sums’ka Oblast, and Černihivs’ka Oblast 
5
 Volyns’ka Oblast, Rivnens’ka Oblast, L’vivs’ka Oblast, Ternopil’s’ka Oblast, Zakarpats’ka  Oblast, Ivano-
Frankivs’ka Oblast, and Černivec’ka Oblast 
6
 Odes’ka Oblast, Mykolaïvs’ka Oblast, and Xersons’ka Oblast 
7
 Xarkivs’ka Oblast, Dnipropetrovs’ka Oblast, Zaporiz’ka Oblast, Donec’ka Oblast, and Luhans’ka Oblast 
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Finally, the political views of the respondents were distilled by asking a question about their 
participation in and views on the Euromaidan and Antimaidan movements. The assumption is that if 
they supported Euromaidan, they most likely have rather pro-European and nationalistic political 
views; if they supported Antimaidan they most likely have pro-Russian political views. The vast 
majority of respondents either actively participated (33%) or supported (52%) Euromaidan; there were 
no active participants of Antimaidan, but 13 respondents said they supported the movement; 6% was 
neutral, 4% was against both, and 3% did not want to say, see also Figure 8Figure 8: political stance of 
survey respondentsFout! Verwijzingsbron niet gevonden..  
 
 
Figure 8: political stance of survey respondents. 
Thus, the respondents of the survey mostly represent ethnic Ukrainians from central and western 
regions with higher education and pro-Ukrainian and/or nationalistic political views, almost all 
working age and with a female bias.  
5.1.3 Results 
In the survey three questions were asked about language use and identification: what is your native 
language; which language(s) do you speak at home; and which language(s) did you speak at home in 
your childhood. The distribution of the languages is different for each question: while Ukrainian is 
reported as native language by a clear majority of the respondents, it is reported as current home 
language by significantly fewer respondents, and less than an absolute majority reports it as childhood 
home language. Especially in the latter category respondents report to use only Russian more often 
than in the other categories (35% versus 26% as current home language and 15% as native language). 
In Figure 9 these differences are clearly visible.  
 
 
Figure 9: reported language use (n = 873). 
In Figure 10, the data on reported language use are split up according to age group. It is clear that there 
is not only a persistent increase of Ukrainian from childhood home language to current home language 
285 
455 
54 
38 13 
28 
active participant Euromaidan
supporter Euromaidan
neutral
against both maidans
supporter of Antimaidan
does not want to say
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Childhood home language
Current home language
Native language Ukrainian
Russian
both
Surzhyk
other
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and native language, but also from respondents aged over 41 to respondents aged 26 until 40 and 
respondents aged 25 and younger. A χ-square test was performed for each question to determine 
whether there is an association between age group and reported language. The tests showed that there 
is a significant association between a younger age and reporting Ukrainian instead of Russian: for 
native language x
2
 (8) = 26.28, p = 0.001; for home language x
2
 (8) = 24.11, p < 0.05; and for 
childhood home language x
2
 (8) = 29.35, p < 0.001.  
 
 
Figure 10: reported language use by age group (under 25: n = 145; 26-40: n = 477; over 40: n = 251). 
Changes in language use: 
In the survey, there were two direct questions about changes in language use: 
Q23: Did you ever consciously change you language behavior? If yes, when and why? 
Q24: Have you noticed changes in the language behavior of friends/acquaintances/on the 
street/on TV since Euromaidan?  If yes, what kind of changes? 
The answers to these questions indicate that the use of languages is very dynamic: 46% said that they 
consciously changed their language use in the past and 68% noticed changes in the language behavior 
of others following Euromaidan.  
Zooming in on the answers of those who changed their language behavior, it was found that 43%
8
 
report they switched to Ukrainian in the past. Although this question did not specifically ask about 
changes since 2014, 14%
9
 of those who changed their language behavior report that they switched to 
Ukrainian since 2014, often directly stating the war or Euromaidan as the reason.  Other specific 
moments people refer to as the reason for their switch to Ukrainian were amongst others the 
independence of Ukraine in 1991, the adoption of the 2012 language law, or the birth of their first 
child. Furthermore, 6% of those reporting changes said they will no longer use or accommodate to 
Russian. However, there are also three respondents who say that following Euromaidan they decided 
to speak only Russian and refrain from using Ukrainian. 
When analyzing the changes respondents observed in the language behavior of 
friends/acquaintances/in the street/on TV it is clear that most people notice an increase in the use of 
Ukrainian in general (38%
10
); many respondents also refer to (a small group of) Russian speakers who 
                                                     
8
 43% of those who changed their language behavior, so 19% of all respondents. 
9
 14% of those who changed their language behavior, so 6% of all respondents. 
10
 38% of those who noticed changes, so 26% of all respondents. 
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switched to Ukrainian either in some domains or completely (38%
11
). Furthermore, some respondents 
make remarks on the kind of Ukrainian that was used: 20 people think that since 2014 a more pure 
variety of Ukrainian is spoken, but 9 respondents argue that the Russian speakers who are switching to 
Ukrainian cause an increase in flawed Ukrainian and/or Surzhyk. For 9 respondents the observed 
increase in the use of Ukrainian is accompanied by aggression towards the Russian language and its 
speakers. However, there were also some respondents who noticed an increase of Russian: 5 people 
refer to the increased use of Russian in western Ukraine (due to Internally Displaced Persons), and 8 
people mention an increase of Russian on TV (due to the increase of bilingual programs). 
Language attitude 
In this section the results of the following four questions on language attitudes will be discussed: 
Q18: what are reasons for you personally to speak Ukrainian? 
Q19: what are reasons for you personally to speak Russian? 
Q21: does the Ukrainian language have a symbolic meaning for you personally? 
Q22: does the Russian language have a symbolic meaning for you personally? 
For each question respondents could choose multiple answers, so the sum of the percentages is higher 
than 100%.  
An overview of the answers given on Q18 and Q19 can be found in Table 4. As is clear from the table, 
the reasons to speak Ukrainian and Russian are distributed quite differently:  most respondents speak 
Ukrainian because it is their native language, followed by political reasons and when it is the language 
of the interlocutor; for Russian, however, language of the interlocutor is chosen most, followed by 
other reasons and native language.  
 
 Ukrainian Russian 
Native language 624 (72%) 235 (28%) 
Language of the interlocutor 377 (44%) 471 (55%) 
Political reasons 415 (48%) 26 (3%) 
Aesthetical reasons 369 (43%) 52 (6%) 
Better knowledge 163 (19%) 115 (14%) 
Other 98  (11%) 291 (34%) 
Table 4: reasons to speak Ukrainian and Russian (Ukrainian: n = 865; Russian: n = 850). 
Because one third of the participants mention other reasons to speak Russian their answers were 
analyzed in more detail. The most cited other reason to speak Russian is if it is the only language in 
which the interlocutor can communicate (mentioned by 13% of all respondents); the second-most cited 
reason was actually that there are no reasons to speak Russian at all, or that the respondent never 
speaks Russian (11% of all respondents).   
As many respondents report that the reason to speak a language is because it is their native language, it 
was decided to split up the answers in groups according to respondents’ native language and see if 
there would be significant differences in the reasons to speak Russian and Ukrainian. In Figure 11 it is 
clearly visible that different reasons to speak a language are mentioned by people with different native 
languages. As expected, Ukrainian native speakers almost all mention that they speak Ukrainian 
because it is their native language, and most Russian native speakers report to speak Russian because 
it is their native language. It also works the other way around: most Ukrainian native speakers report 
to speak Russian ‘because it is the language of their interlocutor’, and most Russian native speakers 
say the same about speaking Ukrainian. Native bilinguals are mostly guided by the language of their 
interlocutor, but the fact that it is their native language is also for them an oft-cited reason. For 
                                                     
11
 38% of those who noticed changes, so 26% of all respondents. 
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respondents who speak Surzhyk natively ‘native language’ is often mentioned as a reason to speak 
Ukrainian (78%), but not frequently for Russian (9%). 
 
 
Figure 11: reasons to speak Ukrainian/Russian by native language (Native language Ukrainian: reasons to speak 
Ukrainian: n = 537; reasons to speak Russian: n = 515. Native language Russian: reasons to speak Ukrainian n = 168; 
reasons to speak Russian: n = 174. Native language both: reasons to speak Ukrainian: n = 134; reasons to speak 
Russian: n = 135. Native language Surzhyk: reasons to speak Ukrainian: n = 23; reasons to speak Russian: n = 23.) 
The analysis of the answers to Q21 and Q22 shows that the symbolic meanings that are attached to the 
Ukrainian language by the respondents are first of all that it is their native language (67%) and that it 
is the official state language (62%); these are followed by ‘language of my ancestors’ (45%) and ‘love 
for the language’ (38%). However, for the Russian language the majority of the respondents reports 
that it does not have a symbolic meaning (66%). For the respondents who do attach symbolic meaning 
to Russian, the most cited meanings are ‘native language’ (21%), ‘language of international 
communication’ (14%), ‘literary language’ (12%), and ‘language of my ancestors’ (7%), see Table 5 
for a complete overview. 
 
 Ukrainian Russian 
Native language 585 (67%) 179 (21%) 
Official state language 543 (62%) 5     (0.6%) 
Language of ancestors 393 (45%) 65   (8%) 
Language of ethnicity 130 (15%) 34   (4%) 
Love for the language 334 (38%) 37   (4%) 
Literary language 105 (12%) 105 (12%) 
Language of international communication   5   (0.5%) 125 (14%) 
Other 42   (5%) 93   (11%) 
No symbolic value 74   (8%) 572 (66%) 
Table 5: symbolic value of the Ukrainian and Russian language (Ukrainian: n = 873; Russian: n = 866). 
As again ‘native language’ is an oft-cited meaning, the results were split by respondents’ reported 
native language, see also Figure 12. Again it is clear that for most Ukrainian native speakers Ukrainian 
is valued as native language (92%), and for most Russian native speakers Russian is valued as native 
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language (70%). Other important values Ukrainian native speakers attach to Ukrainian are ‘language 
of my ancestors’ (57%), ‘official state language’ (54%), and ‘love for the language’ (42%). However, 
for Russian native speakers the second most-cited meaning of Russian is ‘no symbolic meaning’ 
(34%), followed by ‘literary language’ (26%), and ‘language of my ancestors’ (20%). Most Ukrainian 
native speakers do not attach a symbolic meaning to Russian (80%), but if they do it is most often 
another meaning than those that were given (13%), or that Russian is a ‘literary language (11%). The 
other meaning most-cited by Ukrainian native speakers is that Russian is the language of the 
enemy/occupier/aggressor (8% of the Ukrainian native speakers). For many Russian native speakers, 
however, Ukrainian has symbolic meaning as ‘official state language’ (75%, which is actually higher 
than among Ukrainian native speakers) and ‘love for the language (26%); only 28% does not attach 
symbolic meaning to Ukrainian. The results for native bilinguals are also interesting as for them the 
most cited symbolic meaning for Ukrainian is ‘official state language’ (76%) followed by ‘native 
language’ (51%). For Russian the most cited meaning is ‘language of international communication’ 
(78%), followed by ‘no symbolic meaning’ (52%). Native speakers of Surzhyk again value Ukrainian 
as native language (65%), followed by ‘language of my ancestors’ (39%). They mostly do not value 
Russian (57%), but if they do, the most cited meaning is that Russian is the ‘language of international 
communication’ (30%). 
 
 
Figure 12: symbolic meaning of Russian/Ukrainian by native language (Native language Ukrainian: symbolic value 
Ukrainian: n = 538; symbolic value Russian: n = 531. Native language Russian: symbolic value Ukrainian: n = 174; 
symbolic value Russian: n = 174. Native language both: symbolic value Ukrainian: n = 135; symbolic value Russian: n 
= 135. Native language Surzhyk: symbolic value Ukrainian: n = 23; symbolic value Russian: n = 23.) 
5.2 Fieldwork A: street surveys 
In this section, the methodology and results of the street surveys that were conducted in Kyiv, Luc’k, 
Xarkiv, and Kramators’k will be discussed.  
5.2.1 Methodology 
A street survey is a method to gather objective data on the use of different languages in public places 
in a bilingual community. The main asset of the street survey is that it is not based on reported 
knowledge or use of languages, but on the observation of language use of non-suspecting speakers. A 
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pilot version of the street survey was developed by Basque language researchers in 1979 and it has 
been elaborated ever since (Altuna & Basurto, 2013): the basic idea of the street survey is to observe 
the languages used in conversations in the street in a specific place for a certain period of time. The 
place and time of the survey should be chosen carefully in order to optimally ‘catch’ people of all ages 
and socio-economic backgrounds. Altuna and Basurto argue that it is best to walk along a specific 
route at the selected place while inconspicuously eaves-dropping on conversations of the passersby; 
during the observations the researchers should register which language is used in as many 
conversations as they can hear as well as some basic characteristics of the speakers, for example (an 
estimated guess of) age and sex.  
Due to a limited amount of time in Ukraine, it was not possible to fully comply with the guidelines 
provided by Altuna and Basurto. The aim was to do observations twice in the same place on the same 
kind of day and around the same time. However, in Xarkiv and Kramators’k there was only time to do 
observations once in each place. Different audiences were caught by going to different kind of places: 
for example, in central streets of the city there were many people shopping and gallivanting, at a 
market there were many people from the surrounding villages, and in the park there were many 
families with (young) children. It was decided to do observations in the city center and at a market in 
Kramators’k and in Luc’k, in the city center and an entertainment park in Xarkiv, and in Kyiv sessions 
were held near three different metro stations: Kontraktova Plošča, a metro station in the city center in 
the Podil area; Poznjaky, a busy metro station in a residential area in the suburbs; and Lisova, also in 
the suburbs and surrounded by a big market.  
In general the sessions lasted in between 30 and 60 minutes: those in the first week in Kyiv usually 
took about 60 minutes in which approximately 45-55 persons were observed. However, during the 
later sessions the weather was much better, which meant there were more people outside who were 
having conversations (when the weather was cold and rainy, most people hurried from one place to the 
next without saying much), and thus it was a lot easier to eavesdrop. To make sure the sample sizes 
were more balanced, it was decided to do shorter observations of approximately 30-45 minutes which 
would render a similar amount of observations.   
5.2.2 Results of the street surveys 
The results of the street survey clearly illustrate the regional differences in language use: in the eastern 
Ukrainian cities of Xarkiv and Kramators’k almost exclusively Russian is spoken, but in the western 
city of Luc’k almost exclusively Ukrainian. The observed language use in Kyiv was more varied: 
while a majority of the observed conversations was in Russian, Ukrainian also had a clear presence 
and there were also several people mixing Russian and Ukrainian or speaking Surzhyk, especially at 
the market in Lisova. An overview of these results can be found in Figure 13.  
Besides the language someone spoke, it was also registered whether the interlocutors in one 
conversation were speaking in the same language or whether they were using the strategy of ‘non-
accommodation’ as described in chapter 3. In the eastern cities, Kramators’k and Xarkiv, all of the 
observed conversations were held in only one language. In the western city Luc’k all conversations 
observed in the city center were also in one language, but at the market in 2 out of the 34 observed 
conversations the interlocutors were not speaking the same language. The most non-accommodation 
was observed in Kyiv: in Podil 1 out of the 34 conversations was held in two language varieties; in 
Poznjaky 2 out of the 38 conversations in March, but in none of the conversations observed in April; 
in Lisova the most non-accommodated conversations were observed: 4 out of 31 in March, and 5 out 
of 44 in April.  
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Figure 13: results of the street survey. 
5.3 Fieldwork B: interviews 
During the fieldwork in Ukraine in the spring of 2017, many conversations were held with Ukrainians 
about their thoughts on the language situation: with approximately 10 people semi-structured 
interviews were conducted based on a list of questions (the English translation of these questions can 
be found in Appendix 2), but many other people shared their views on language use and language 
policy in Ukraine in a more informal manner.   
The most important finding of the interviews was that in real life the use of Ukrainian and Russian is 
not such an important issue as might be expected on the basis of the debates on the internet. One of the 
first things almost all interviewees said was that there is no language problem in Ukraine, and if there 
would be one, it is caused by politicians who manipulate and extort regional and linguistic differences 
in the Ukrainian society for their own gain. To some extent this does indeed seem to be reflected in 
real life: in the street both languages are used and when interlocutors speak in different languages they 
understand each other very well. Moreover, almost everyone seems to agree on the main pillars of 
language policy, i.e. that Ukrainian should be the only official state language and that its position 
should be strengthened, while at home everyone can decide for themselves in whichever language 
(variety) they wish to speak.  
However, the devil is in the details: what exactly is the domain of the ‘official state language’ and 
what is still considered one’s ‘private sphere’? At which point does the ‘strengthening’ of the position 
of Ukrainian interfere with the rights and interests of native Russian speakers? If every child should 
learn Ukrainian properly, does that require all schools to have Ukrainian as the only language of 
instruction? When going to a store or café in one’s neighborhood, is that to be considered a public 
domain, and should all personnel thus address customers in Ukrainian first? Or is this part of the 
private domain and should the owner of the restaurant decide in which language his personnel should 
address clients? Is putting quota’s on the use of Ukrainian the same as officially limiting (forbidding) 
the use of Russian? Even though most respondents claimed that there was a general consensus on 
these issues, it was clear to me that what some considered their private right to choose which language 
to speak, was perceived by others as a continuation of Russification: while some think it is fair and 
justified to require public services to be in Ukrainian unless the client wants to be served in another 
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language, others think the government should not interfere in this domain and it should be up to the 
market to adapt to the demands of the public.  
When discussing recent changes, most people argued that the current conflict has an effect on 
language use and attitudes: they have the impression that language use has become more political and 
that language can now be used as a political instrument or to stress a certain identity. They also 
noticed that certain groups expressing aggressive attitudes towards the use of Russian have become 
more vocal. Russian speakers have noticed this especially on the internet and occasionally in real life, 
but in general they do not experience discrimination or aggression because of their language choice. In 
Kyiv and eastern Ukraine, some Ukrainian speakers mentioned aggressive reactions to the use of 
Ukrainian: sometimes people refused to provide services, for example in a taxi or in public transport. 
Nevertheless, they also mentioned that they received many positive reactions: people who would give 
a compliment on speaking Ukrainian so well or beautifully. 
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6. Discussion 
The results of the survey and the fieldwork discussed in the previous chapter as well as the overview 
of changes in the language situation in Ukraine since 2014 in chapter 4 brought many interesting 
developments and findings to the fore. These findings illustrate that the language situation in Ukraine 
is highly dynamic, and it leaves no doubt that there have been changes in the language use and 
attitudes of Ukrainians over the past three years. This chapter will discuss the kind of changes that 
were found in more detail and will analyze whether these developments are (partly) caused by the 
eruption of violent conflict. In section 6.1 the changes in language use are analyzed and in 6.2 the 
changes in language attitudes; a possible framework for the effect of a violent conflict on language use 
and attitudes is developed in 6.3, followed by suggestions for future research in 6.4. 
6.1 Analysis of changes in language use 
Almost all sources on the language use of Ukrainians indicate that there is an increase in the use of the 
Ukrainian language: surveys on reported native and home language all show an increase of Ukrainian, 
and the monitoring by Prostir Svobody also shows an expansion of Ukrainian in most domains. 
However, most surveys only include data on reported language use, and it is unclear whether the 
increase in the reported use of Ukrainian reflects an increase in the actual use of Ukrainian. The 
blossoming of many newly developed language initiatives gives the impression that there are real new 
developments in the language situation in Ukraine. Especially the existence of groups for Russian 
speakers who are switching to Ukrainian proves that there are Ukrainians who did not or only rarely 
spoke Ukrainian before, but changed their language use and now speak almost exclusively Ukrainian. 
The results of the thesis survey support these findings: the respondents report an increase in the use of 
Ukrainian in general, and in particular they mention Russian speakers who are switching to Ukrainian, 
and Ukrainian speakers who no longer switch to Russian. The survey results furthermore seem to 
confirm that for many respondents the outbreak of the conflict was a turning point after which they 
consciously chose to speak (only) Ukrainian in order to express their Ukrainian identity. Such a switch 
is both confirming and denying the intrinsic link between language and identity: on the one hand, 
Russian speakers who want their language to be in accordance with their Ukrainian identity use the 
idea that language and identity should match as a reason to switch, but at the same time they proved 
that language and identity are not intrinsically linked, by previously speaking Russian while 
identifying themselves as Ukrainian (Bilaniuk, 2015). Either way, this line of reasoning does confirm 
that (some) Ukrainians are intentionally changing their language in order to dissociate themselves 
from Russia and a Russian identity because of the increased socio-political indexical meaning of the 
languages. Thus,  the conflict is at least partly causing the shift towards Ukrainian. 
However, the increase in declaring Ukrainian as native language already started after Ukrainian 
independence in 1991 as discussed in section 3.1. The results of the online survey also indicate that the 
use of Ukrainian increased over time: an analysis of apparent time shows that respondents report the 
use of Ukrainian more often as current home language than as childhood language, and Ukrainian is 
also reported more as native language and home language by younger respondents than by older 
respondents, see also Figure 9 and Figure 10 (partly repeated here for clarity’s sake in Figure 14 and 
Figure 15). If this trend would have continued normally since 2014, it would already cause an increase 
in the use of Ukrainian and part of the increase in the use of Ukrainian thus has to be accounted for by 
the trend, not the conflict.  
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Figure 14: reported current and childhood home language (n = 873). 
 
Figure 15: current home language by age group (under 25: n = 145; 26-40: n = 477; over 40: n = 251). 
Another change that was observed was a shift towards more ‘pure’ language use: there are many 
initiatives that advocate ‘pure’ Ukrainian, free of supposedly ‘Russian elements’. However, it is 
unclear whether the growth of these initiatives also led to an increase in the use of pure Ukrainian: 
only a few survey respondents mentioned such a development while others claimed the opposite, i.e. 
that the use of impure Ukrainian increased, because of Russian speakers who try to switch to 
Ukrainian but in effect speak Surzhyk. These results also suggest that the group of people for whom 
‘language matters’ (cf. Bilaniuk (2016a)) is maybe smaller than their vocal presence at social media 
might suggest: it is possible that there is a ‘silent majority’, for whom language use and purity do not 
matter. 
Lastly, the observations made during the street surveys indicate that, while there can be changes in 
language use at a personal level, these are not (yet) observable at the level of language use in a city. In 
Kyiv, Xarkiv and Kramators’k Russian is still spoken by the majority of people in the street, as was 
expected on the basis of the reported language use before 2014. Even though it is possible that there is 
a slight increase in the use of Ukrainian, this cannot be established due to the absence of a street 
survey before 2014. Nevertheless it is probable that the language shift of a some Russian speakers 
does not have a noticeable impact at the level of big cities.  
6.2 Analysis of change in language attitude 
Most sources also point to changes in language attitudes. Although it is not easy to measure attitudes, 
Kulyk (2016) concluded on the basis of survey data that for most people the attitude towards the 
Ukrainian language had become more positive, while the attitude towards Russian mostly had not 
changed except for a small group that reported more negative attitudes. The survey results also 
indicated that the Ukrainian language is strongly connected to the Ukrainian state and is seen as a 
national symbol. Surveys by the Razumkov Center furthermore show that support for Ukrainian as the 
sole state language increased.  
The results of the thesis survey again confirm these findings. Respondents’ attitudes towards 
Ukrainian are very positive: the language is valued above all as native language and the official state 
language of Ukraine, which also illustrates the strong connection between the Ukrainian language and 
a Ukrainian identity. The importance of this connection also explains why Ukrainian is reported as 
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native language much more often than as home language and childhood home language, and in some 
cases even by people who do not have active knowledge of the language. 
The survey respondents further reported slightly more negative attitudes towards Russian, and some 
also associate the language with the conflict. This was most clearly visible in their reasons to speak 
Russian and the symbolic value of the language. The former question was only asked if respondents 
had mentioned in an earlier question that they had active knowledge of Russian, but still 11% 
answered that there are no reasons to speak Russian and/or that they do not use this language; another 
13% said they only spoke Russian if this was the sole shared language with the interlocutor, thus 
expressing a strong resistance towards speaking Russian. Moreover, 41 respondents independently 
from each other declared that for them the Russian language is the language of the enemy or occupier. 
Speaking Ukrainian, however, has become more politically relevant: almost half of the respondents 
said they spoke Ukrainian because of political reasons, while this was only mentioned by 3% with 
regards to Russian. This illustrates that Ukrainians are now more consciously paying attention to the 
socio-political meaning attached to certain language use and thus the indexical meaning of the 
languages has become more closely associated with a certain political stance. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the majority of the respondents are neutral towards Russian: for more than 
half, the language has no symbolic value, and the most cited reason to speak Russian is if it is the 
language of the interlocutor. Thus, while some negative attitudes are indeed present, for most people 
Russian is a neutral language, used mostly to communicate with Russian speakers. During the 
fieldwork, Russian speaking interviewees mentioned that they noticed some Ukrainian speakers had 
become more hostile towards the Russian language and Russian speakers since 2014. Some of them 
therefore decided not to switch to Ukrainian anymore, but they also admitted that the hostilities were 
mostly present on the internet and social media and that they did not experience it in their everyday 
life. However, the adoption of new language laws that anticipate extensive Ukrainization policies 
might alter this situation and cause Russian speakers to perceive the forced increase in Ukrainian as 
discrimination against Russian. 
Although the general trends are a more positive attitude towards Ukrainian and a more negative 
attitude towards Russian, the survey data discussed by Kulyk (2016) also indicate that a small group of 
Ukrainians developed more negative associations with Ukrainian, in particular those who were against 
Euromaidan and who are critical of the Anti-Terrorist Operation that the Ukrainian army is conducting 
in eastern Ukraine. For these people, the Ukrainian language has become associated with the violence 
used by the Ukrainian military, and this has affected their attitudes to become more negative (Kulyk, 
2016, p. 602). Unfortunately, there were hardly any respondents who had such views on the Ukrainian 
language in the thesis survey, so I can only conclude that among the group of respondents that 
participated in the thesis survey, i.e. high educated ethnic Ukrainians from western and central 
Ukraine, such views are rare. 
6.3 Effects of a conflict on language use and attitudes 
Now that the changes in language use and language attitudes since the conflict started have been 
established, it is possible to take the first steps towards a framework that can describe the effects of a 
conflict on language in general. The results of the different research methods used in this thesis all 
indicate that some Ukrainians are intentionally changing their language use, mostly to stress their 
Ukrainian identity and to dissociate from Russia, i.e. to diverge. This effect of the violent conflict on 
the language can be explained by changes in the indexicality of the Russian and Ukrainian language: 
due to the conflict, the socio-political meanings attached to each language have come to the fore and 
are more consciously noticed by the speakers, i.e. the languages have become more indexical of the 
political stance of the speaker. This is confirmed by the changes in language attitudes: a more negative 
36 
 
evaluation of Russian is mostly due to the negative association of the Russian language with the 
‘enemy’ in the current conflict.  
Based on these results the following two effects can be established. Firstly, language conflict leads to 
an increase in the significance of a person’s political stance, which brings the socio-political meaning 
to the fore and thus increases the indexical function of the language; the increased indexical meaning 
subsequently becomes a reason for a certain group of people to change their language use so that it fits 
better with the socio-political meaning that this use indexes, see Figure 16 for a schematic overview.  
This framework explains why Russian speaking Ukrainians are switching to Ukrainian, and why some 
Ukrainian speakers are more reluctant to or even completely avoiding speaking Russian.  
 
Figure 16: schematic overview effect conflict on language use. 
The second effect of violent conflict is that it brings issues of group identity to the fore, which 
encourages people to protect their group, for instance by protecting the language of the group, see 
Figure 17 for a visualization. This effect is most clearly visible among those Ukrainians to whom 
‘language matters’ and who want to create more linguistic distance between Russian and Ukrainian, 
for example by avoiding words and constructions that are perceived as ‘Russian elements’ in 
Ukrainian.  
 
Figure 17: schematic overview effect conflict on language and identity. 
These effects of violent conflict were also visible in Croatia and other former Yugoslav countries 
during and after the Yugoslav wars in the nineties: each newly established country developed their 
own standard language aiming to make it as linguistically distinct from the others as possible (cf. 
Bugarski (2012), and Dedaić and Nelson (2003)). The main difference is that while in Ukraine it is 
mostly civil society that is calling for changes and purification, in Croatia the linguistic changes were 
first and foremost carried out by official governmental and language institutions (Droogsma, 2016). 
 
6.4 Suggestions for future research 
The research presented in this thesis has touched upon many different topics related to conflict 
linguistics, bilingualism, and identity, and it has contributed to the development of a framework for 
how a violent conflict can affect the language use and language attitudes of the people directly 
affected by the conflict. However, this framework is based on the developments in Ukraine and it is 
possible that violent conflicts affect the language use and attitudes differently in another country or 
region. Future research should analyze other conflict situations and test whether the framework 
developed in this thesis is applicable in those situations.  
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The language use and attitudes of Ukrainians from eastern and southern regions should also be studied 
more intensively, as the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine were underrepresented in the thesis 
survey. Besides the regional spread, future research should make sure to include more ethnic Russians 
as well, because this group was also underrepresented in this thesis. The inclusion of these groups is 
important, especially because they most likely have very different language use and attitudes than the 
ethnic Ukrainians from western and central regions that were the vast majority of respondents in this 
thesis. If the respondents’ sample is a better reflection of the Ukrainian society in general, the 
conclusions on language use and attitudes can show a clearer picture of the language situation and can 
contribute to a more balanced language policy.  
Another angle for future research could be to disentangle the effects of the violent conflict that erupted 
in 2014 and the effect of Ukraine’s independence in 1991: the Census and survey data suggest that the 
use of Ukrainian has increased since independence and as a result the younger generation of 
Ukrainians speaks Ukrainian more than the older generation. The already existing trend of increase in 
the use of Ukrainian made it harder to distinguish whether the increase since 2014 was due to the 
continuation of the general trend or the effect of the conflict. Future research can shed more light on 
this issue, for example by conducting qualitative interviews within a small community and analyzing 
the differences in language use and attitudes between the different age groups as well as when and 
why some people switched their language. Such a research could be complemented by an in-depth 
study of Russian speakers who switched to Ukrainian, i.e. analyze when and why they switched, their 
demographic characteristics etc. These detailed analyses will facilitate a distinction between the effect 
of the conflict and the general trend of increased use of Ukrainian.  
Finally, if (one of) the proposed language laws is/are adopted, the language use and attitudes in 
Ukraine are likely to change even more and possibly also quicker. Future research should take the 
effects of these legislative changes into account.  
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7. Conclusion 
This thesis has given a detailed overview of the language situation in Ukraine; based on three 
theoretical concepts, i.e. divergence, intentional language change, and indexicality, the recent 
developments in the language use and language attitudes of Ukrainians were analyzed and a 
framework of the effect of a military conflict on the language situation was developed. The analysis 
was based on the results of the most recent nationwide surveys, language monitoring, and empirical 
data from the internet, as well as the results of a survey and fieldwork which were carried out as part 
of this thesis. 
The data discussed in chapters 4 and 5 as well as the analysis in chapter 6 have shown that the use of 
the Ukrainian language has increased since 2014 at the cost of Russian: there is a group of Russian 
speakers who have switched to Ukrainian, and there are also Ukrainian speakers who in recent years 
stopped using Russian when communicating with Russian speaking Ukrainians. Nevertheless, it seems 
that only a small group is changing their language use: the majority of the Russian speakers do not 
(consider to) switch to Ukrainian, and the results of the street survey proved that Russian is still 
spoken by a majority in formerly Russian speaking cities. The increase of Ukrainian is partly 
connected to the outbreak of violent conflict; as argued in 6.1, it incited a desire to align one’s 
language use with one’s  stance in the conflict. This means that Russian speakers who are supporting 
the Ukrainian side of the conflict want to express this stance by intentionally diverging their language 
from the ‘enemy’ Russia and switching to Ukrainian. 
Furthermore, it was found on the basis of the data in chapters 4 and 5 that there were also several 
developments in the language attitudes of Ukrainians since 2014. The analysis in 5.1 and 6.2 showed 
that for most people the Ukrainian language is appreciated more and it has become more closely 
associated with politics and with a Ukrainian identity. Ukrainians’ attitudes towards Russian have 
become somewhat more negative: a certain group of Ukrainians sees Russian first and foremost as the 
language of the enemy or occupier, and some actively avoid the use of this language, cf. 5.1.3. 
However, for most people Russian is just a language that they know quite well and speak when their 
interlocutor speaks it. Secondly, there is a new dichotomy in language attitudes: Ukrainians are no 
longer just divided by their support for either Ukrainization or continued dominance of Russian, but 
also by whether they think language matters or not (Bilaniuk, 2016b). Among the former, linguistic 
purism is common, especially to avoid ‘Russian elements’, while the latter group consciously chooses 
to make use of non-standard language, for instance Surzhyk as discussed in 4.2. These observed 
changes are all connected to the conflict and can be explained by the increased political value that is 
indexed by the languages. This confirms that the indexical meaning of languages can change due to a 
violent conflict. 
The observed changes can be explained by the concepts of divergence, intentional language change 
and indexicality and on the basis of these concepts a framework of the effects of a conflict on language 
use and attitudes was developed in 6.3. The two following effects have been established:  
I. violent conflict  >  increase significance political stance  >  increase indexical meaning 
language  >  match language to socio-political indexical meaning 
II. violent conflict  >  group identity becomes important  >  protection group identity  > 
protection group language 
These effects explain how and why Russian speakers are switching to Ukrainian and why Ukrainian 
speakers are more concerned with speaking ‘pure’ Ukrainian without ‘Russian elements’. However, 
the conflict only affects a part of the population and many people seem to be neutral with regards to 
language use and attitudes. Future research should investigate whether these effects developed within 
the framework are also applicable to other conflict situations.  
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Appendix A: English translation of survey questions 
 
1. Age: <18; 18-25; 26-40; 41-65; >65 
2. Sex: male; female; other 
3. Place of residence 
4. Previous place(s) of residence (please only mention those places where you lived 2 years or 
more) 
5. Profession 
6. Education level: higher education; secondary education; primary education; I don’t want to 
say 
7. Ethnicity (it is possible to choice multiple answers): Ukrainian; Russian; Crimean-Tatar; 
Belarussian; other, namely… 
8. Did you participate in the events of 2013-2014: yes I actively participated in Euromaidan; yes, 
I actively participated in Antimaidan; no, I did not actively participate, but I supported 
Euromaidan; no, I did not actively participate, but I supported Antimaidan; no, I was neutral; 
no, I was against both Maidans; I don’t want to say. 
9. What is your native language: Ukrainian; Russian; Ukrainian and Russian; Crimean-Tatar; 
Surzhyk; other, namely… 
10. Which language(s) do you know and at what level (I don’t know it; I understand but do not 
speak it; basic level; intermediary level; high level; fluently): Ukrainian; Russian; Crimean-
Tatar; Surzhyk; English; other, namely… 
11. Which language(s) do you speak at home: Ukrainian; Russian; Crimean-Tatar; Surzhyk; other, 
namely… 
12. Which language(s) did you speak at home during your childhood: Ukrainian; Russian; 
Crimean-Tatar; Surzhyk; other, namely… 
13. With whom do you speak Ukrainian and how often (never, sometimes, often, always, not 
applicable): with family; with friends; with colleagues/classmates; with clients; with unknown 
people in the street; in shops/at the market/in restaurants 
14. With whom do you speak Russian and how often (never, sometimes, often, always, not 
applicable): with family; with friends; with colleagues/classmates; with clients; with unknown 
people in the street; in shops/at the market/in restaurants 
15. With whom do you speak Surzhyk and how often (never, sometimes, often, always, not 
applicable): with family; with friends; with colleagues/classmates; with clients; with unknown 
people in the street; in shops/at the market/in restaurants 
16. When you are addressed by a stranger in the street in Russian, in which language do you 
reply: Ukrainian; Russian; it depends on… 
17. When you are addressed by a stranger in the street in Ukrainian, in which language do you 
reply: Ukrainian; Russian; it depends on… 
18. What are reasons for you personally to speak Ukrainian: native language; language of 
interlocutor; better knowledge; aesthetical reasons; political reasons; other, namely… 
19. What are reasons for you personally to speak Russian: native language; language of 
interlocutor; better knowledge; aesthetical reasons; political reasons; other, namely… 
20. What are reasons for you personally to speak Surzhyk: native language; language of 
interlocutor; better knowledge; aesthetical reasons; political reasons; other, namely… 
21. Does the Ukrainian language have a symbolic meaning for you personally: no, the Ukrainian 
language has no symbolic meaning; native language; official state language; language of my 
ethnic group; language of my forefathers; love for the language; language of high literature; 
language of international communication; yeas another meaning, namely… 
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22. Does the Russian language have a symbolic meaning for you personally: no, the Russian 
language has no symbolic meaning; native language; official state language; language of my 
ethnic group; language of my forefathers; love for the language; language of high literature; 
language of international communication; yeas another meaning, namely… 
23. Did you ever consciously change your language behavior? If yes, when and why? 
24. Did you notice changes in the language behavior of friends/acquaintances/in the street/on TV 
following Euromaidan? If yes, what kind of changes? 
25. To what extent do you agree with the following statements (completely disagree; somewhat 
disagree; somewhat agree; completely disagree; hard to say): 
a. Ukrainian should be the only official language in Ukraine 
b. Every Ukrainian should know the Ukrainian language 
c. Every Ukrainian citizen should speak only Ukrainian 
d. People should only speak pure Ukrainian 
e. If someone cannot speak pure Ukrainian, it is preferable that they speak Russian than 
mixed Ukrainian 
f. The status of the Ukrainian language is important for the stability of the state 
g. Every Ukrainian citizen should be able to understand Russian 
h. Russian should be an official state language in Ukraine 
i. Russian should have some official status on regional level 
j. Widespread use of Russian in Ukraine destabilizes the country 
k. The state should do more to support the use of Ukrainian 
l. The state should do more to support the needs of Russian-speaking Ukrainians 
26. Do you have any further comments on the topic of the use of Russian and Ukrainian in 
Ukraine or remarks on this survey? Please, share them here. 
27. Are you interested and available to do an interview on your language use and views on 
languages in Ukraine (in the period of 21 March-7 April)? If yes, please leave your contact 
details. 
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Appendix B: English translation of fieldwork question form 
 
A. Language use 
1. How/where did you learn Ukrainian? How often do you speak Ukrainian? In which 
situations and with whom?   
2. How/where did you learn Russian? How often do you speak Russian? In which 
situations and with whom?   
3. Would you consider yourself to be primarily Ukrainophone, Russophone, bilingual, or 
other? 
4. Do you adapt your language to the language of your interlocutor, or not? Under which 
circumstances? 
5. Did you ever consciously change your language use? When, why and how? 
6. Do you sometimes speak Surzhyk, or did you speak in in the past? In which situations, 
for what kind of reasons? 
B. Attitudes towards impure language 
1. What do you think about Surzhyk? What does this word refer to? Which associations 
do you have with this word?  
2. What do you think about people who mix languages (whose sentences are partly in 
Russian and partly in Ukrainian? And what do you think about situations in which one 
interlocutor speaks Ukrainian and the other Russian? 
3. What is more important: understanding each other or pure language use? 
C. Language attitudes in general 
1. Do the Ukrainian and/or Russian languages have a symbolic value/meaning for you 
personally? 
2. What do you think about the state of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine? In your 
opinion, should the language change or be changed? Or the language laws? How?  
3. What do you think about the state of the Russian language in Ukraine? In your 
opinion, should the language change or be changed? Or the language laws? How? 
4. What do you think about the laws concerning languages? Do you know anything 
about the new law proposals? What do you think about the idea of creating a 
Ukrainian standard for the Russian language (like there is an American and a British 
standard of English)?  
5. In your opinion, what role should the Ukrainian language play in the Ukrainian state 
and/or in the Ukrainian society?  
6. In your opinion, what role should the Russian language play in the Ukrainian state 
and/or in the Ukrainian society?  
 
